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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
bound in solido, the husband's partial payment did not constitute
an interruption as against the wife. In addition to the issue of
interruption of prescription and the applicability of special rules
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, there may also be an issue
of suretyship involved in this kind of a situation; a rehearing or
a review might have cleared up some questions.
General Matters
In Hayes v. Muller13 there is an interesting and useful dis-
cussion leading to the conclusion that liberative prescription
runs against the claimant's "action" and not against the "cause
of action." This is related to another question as to whether lib-
erative prescription "extinguishes" or merely "bars" the debtor's
obligation.14 In the principal case, the court held that the earlier
lawsuit was based on the same cause of action and interrupted
prescription even though different relief was demanded in the
later suit which had been instituted more than ten years after
the transaction between the parties.
In Leach v. Leach 5 there is the statement that an earlier
case held "the acknowledgement of an indebtedness evidenced
by a judgment does not revive the judgment but merely inter-
rupts prescription on the debt,"' and taken out of context this
is given as one of the headnotes at the beginning of the report
despite the assertion on the same page of the opinion that the
debt ceases to exist when it is merged in the judgment.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL SERVrrUDES
There were two cases decided during the 1970-71 term
involving questions of prescription of mineral servitudes. The
13. 243 So.2d 830 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971), writ refused, 258 La. 215, 245
So.2d 411.
14. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 1758: "Natural obligations are of four kinds:
"3. When the action Is barred by prescription, a natural obligation
still subsists, although the civil obligation is extinguished."
15. 238 So.2d 26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
16. Id. at 29.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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first of these, Hanszen v. Cocke' involved a mineral servitude
created in 1935 in favor of plaintiffs' ancestor in title. At the
time of creation of the servitude interest in question, the prop-
erty burdened by it was already subject to a mineral lease. No
operations were conducted on the servitude tract or acreage
unitized with it until 1947, and production was not obtained
until 1951. The lease of the servitude tract was released as to
twenty-five acres of the approximately two hundred acres bur-
dened by the servitude in 1938. In 1940, after expiration of the
primary term and while the lease was being maintained by
production from other lands covered thereby, the landowner
filed suit claiming that the lease had expired. It took in excess
of three years to dispose of that litigation.
Plaintiffs in the instant case contended that the filing of
the suit by the landowner, contesting the validity of the lease
covering the servitude tract and other lands, constituted an
obstacle to the running of prescription under article 792 of the
Civil Code. If plaintiffs had been successful in establishing
their position, prescription would have thereby been suspended
for a sufficient length of time to have permitted the drilling
operations in 1947 to interrupt prescription and subsequent pro-
duction in 1951 to have further interrupted prescription until
1961 when production ceased.
The court, affirming the decision of the district court, re-
jected plaintiffs' argument. Conceding for the sake of argument
only that another result might have followed if the entire servi-
tude tract had been subject to the lease at the time the land-
owner filed the suit contesting its validity, the court held that
since a twenty-five acre portion of the tract was not subject
to the lease and could have been utilized by the servitude owner
at any time during the prescriptive period, there was in fact
no obstacle as contemplated by article 792. In so doing, the
court took note of the opinion by the court of appeal in Mire v.
Hawkins,2 distinguishing the earlier holding of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Boddie v. Drewett8 on the ground that the
entirety of the servitude tract there in question had not been
included in the unit or units established by the Commissioner of
Conservation and could thus have been utilized by the servitude
1. 246 So.2d 200 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
2. 177 So.2d 795 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
3. 229 La. 1017, 87 So.2d 516 (1956).
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owner, thus allowing circumvention of the holding in Boddie v.
Drewett4 that inclusion of the entirety of the servitude tract
within a drilling unit constituted an obstacle to the accrual of
prescription. The appellate opinion in Mire and the earlier de-
cision in Boddie were, of course, reversed by the supreme court
on writs in Mire v. Hawkins.5 However, the court of appeal in
the instant case felt that the reasoning of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeal in Mire was persuasive on the point that, as the servi-
tude owner could exercise his rights on a portion of the tract,
no obstacle within the meaning of article 792 could be found
to exist.
The analysis of this point by the court, quoting the opinion
of the district judge, appears sound. Considering the fact that
the events in question took place some thirty to thirty-five years
ago, it seems that the claimants of the mineral servitude interest
had only lately become concerned about holding onto or re-
viving their rights.
The second case of the recent term involving prescription
of mineral servitudes is Baker v. Chevron Oil Co.,6 in which the
tract subject to plaintiffs' servitude was in the process of being
included in a voluntary unit at the time the prescriptive date
passed. The unit well was on land other than the servitude tract,
and was completed as a producer on January 6, 1966. It was
obvious that, as the well was a gas well, unitization would be
necessary. One of the tracts to be included within the unit was
a small tract belonging to the Lincoln Parish School Board.
Plaintiffs' lessee proceeded to go through the necessary adminis-
trative processes, including advertisement for bids, consent of
the school board, and approval by the State Mineral Board, to
include the school board tract in the unit. This process was
completed on March 4, 1966, approximately three and one-half
weeks prior to the prescriptive date on March 29. On March 4,
plaintiffs' lessee drew up a unit declaration and proceeded to
circulate it to the necessary operating parties in the unit. How-
ever, signatures were not obtained from two of the other op-
erating parties until April 1966, and the unit declaration was not
filed of record until May 9, 1966.
The theory upon which plaintiffs' attorneys relied is some-
4. Id.
5. 249 La. 278, 186 So.2d 591 (1966).
6. 245 So.2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
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what difficult to discern. However, it was argued that prescrip-
tion should be considered to have been interrupted on the date
the unit declaration was drawn up by plaintiffs' lessee. The
court, conceding that voluntary pooling clauses are legal and
that, as urged under article 1901 of the Civil Code, agreements
"legally entered into have the effect of laws on those who have
formed them," nevertheless held that the precise issue was when
the unitization declaration was executed and became effective.
It was clear from the record that the necessary executions were
not obtained until after the prescriptive date of plaintiffs' servi-
tude, and that the unit declaration did not become effective
until some five or six weeks after that point in time. Thus, the
court had no difficulty in concluding, and correctly so, that
plaintiffs' servitude had expired.
MINERAL ROYALTIES
A rather important decision in the field of mineral royalties,
but one which could have probably been forecast from prior
jurisprudence,7 is found in Exchange Oil & Gas Co. v. Foster.,
The suit in question was a concursus proceeding provoked by
plaintiff. The issue was the same as that presented concerning
mineral servitudes in Trunkline Gas Co. v. Steen,9 that is, whe-
ther production from a unit well located on a tract subject to
a royalty interrupts prescription as to the remainder of the
royalty tract located outside the boundaries of the unit estab-
lished by order of the Commissioner of Conservation. The court
of appeal engaged in an extended review of prior jurisprudence
in the entire area of use by unit operations. Ultimately, how-
ever, the court concluded that the decision in Trunkline was
dispositive of the case before it and held that where production
interrupting prescription as to the royalty was from a well
situated on the royalty tract, prescription was interrupted as to
the entirety of the tract even though the unit served by the well
located thereon included only a portion of the tract. This result
is unquestionably correct. As suggested by Judge Sartain's
concurring opinion, the Trunkline decision and perhaps the de-
cision of the court in this case reflect "the final step in the move-
7. Frey v. Miller, 165 So.2d 43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); cf. Trunkline
Gas. Co. v. Steen, 249 La. 520, 187 So.2d 720 (1966).
8. 237 So.2d 904 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
9. 249 La. 520, 187 So.2d 720 (1966).
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ment away from the 'division theories,' ,,l of earlier cases. Judge
Sartain takes issue with certain interpretations by the majority
of Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barrouse"l and Trunkline.
Neither the author's available time nor space in this publication
permit a full analysis of the majority opinion and Judge Sar-
tain's objection to it. It is enough to say at this point that the
result reached is in keeping with the Trunkline decision and at
least maintains uniformity in the decisions concerning the effect
of compulsory unitization on servitudes and royalties. This
author has previously criticized the existent disharmony be-
tween the cases involving compulsory unitization as compared
with those involving voluntary unitization.12
MINERAL LEASES
Express Clauses
Commencement of Operations
In Breaux v. Apache Oil Corp.'s plaintiffs sought to have
the court declare that a mineral lease had expired by its own
terms for failure of the lessee to commence operations for the
drilling of a well or to pay delay rentals within the specified
time. On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary
judgment by the district court in favor of defendants, the court
of appeal affirmed. Approximately two and one-half weeks
prior to the anniversary date of the lease in question, a unitiza-
tion order was issued by the Commissioner of Conservation
establishing a unit including a portion of the land under lease
from plaintiffs to defendants. Five days before the anniversary
date in question, the commissioner's order was amended, chang-
ing the location of the unit well. Two days before the anni-
versary date defendants commenced building a board road and
turn-around to the well location. Construction of the road and
turn-around was completed on the anniversary date. It was
disputed whether drilling equipment was moved onto the site
on that date or subsequently.
The-lease in question provided that the lease would termi-
10. 237 So.2d 904, 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
11. 238 La. 1013, 117 So.2d 575 (1960).
12. See, e.g., Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws
and Practices on the Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Mineral Royalty, 25
LA. L. REV. 824 (1965).
13. 240 So.2d 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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nate on the anniversary date in question unless, on or before
that date, lessee either commenced "operations for the drilling
of a well on the land, or on acreage pooled therewith," or paid
the stipulated delay rental. The court, citing Hilliard v. Franz-
heim,1 4 reasonably construed the activties in question as being
sufficient to constitute a commencement of "operations for the
drilling of a well." This case affords an interesting comparison
with the decision in Wehran v. Helis,15 not mentioned in Breaux,
in which it was held that use of a dredge on a well site to prepare
it for reception of a drilling barge was insufficient to preserve
the lease there in question. However, the lease in the Wehran
case provided that "operations hereunder shall be deemed to be
commenced when the first material is placed on the ground."' 6
The court there construed the term "material" as meaning ma-
terial to be used in the drilling of the well. Apparently the
lease in the Breaux case did not contain the same provision,
thus affording a legitimate basis for distinction of the two cases.
Payment of Rent-Default
Construction of a gravel lease was required in Dietrich v.
Davis. -7 In contrast to the normal oil and gas lease form, the
gravel lease there in question provided that if rental payments
were not timely made, the lease would not expire unless lessor
notified lessee by registered mail and allowed ten days from
the date of delivery of that notice for the lessee to remedy the
default and make the payment. A rental date passed, and plain-
tiffs, who had acquired a portion of the property subject to the
lease from the original lessor, wrote to the lessee by ordinary
mail asserting that the lease had terminated and asking for the
return of gate keys. Citing articles 1901 and 1945 of the Louisiana
Civil Code concerning the binding effect of agreements and rules
of construction and supporting jurisprudence, the court properly
held that the lease had not expired. The letter dispatched by
lessors was not by registered mail as required by the lease, nor
was it a demand for payment; it was merely an assertion that the
lease had expired.
This case is an apt illustration of the fact that the provisions
of the ordinary oil, gas, and mineral lease regarding automatic
14. 180 So.2d 746 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
15. 152 So.2d 220 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
16. Id. at 224.
17. 246 So.2d 710 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
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termination for failure to pay rentals represent the consensus of
the parties in structuring that particular type of contract and
not any legal requirement. The oil and gas lease has evolved
with the provision for automatic termination, an express reso-
lutory condition, because those in the industry generally do not
wish to become bound to an alternative obligation either to
drill a well or to pay delay rentals. It is the desire of operators
to have an option to maintain the lease without any required
economic commitment either in the form of the outlay for
drilling a well or payment of rentals. However, as illustrated
by the gravel lease contract in question in the Dietrich case, such
agreements could be structured differently and it could certainly
be required that in the event of nonperformance the contract
would not terminate unless the lessee is properly placed in
default by the lessor.
Releases
The circumstances of Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Chap-
puis18 represent the constant, nightmarish specter which must
follow many operators, and more particularly their clerical
personnel in either land or production departments-the re-
lease of a producing lease. The lease in question in this case
was being maintained by three producing units, one of which
ceased production. The lease provided that if production ceased
and was not restored, or drilling or reworking operations com-
menced within ninety days thereafter, the lease would termi-
nate as to that portion which had ceased producing. The lessor
made a demand on Humble based upon the cessation of pro-
duction of one of the three units for a release sufficient to obtain
cancellation from the public records in accordance with R.S.
30:102. The request was forwarded by Humble's Lafayette office
to its lease records and rentals section in New Orleans, which
prepared a release of approximately twenty seven leases in-
cluding the entirety of the lease in question and the entirety of
all of the other leases in the two remaining producing units in-
volved in this case. Shortly thereafter, Humble discovered the
error. Corrective instruments were prepared and signed by all of
the lessors except defendant in this case. The established value
of the two remaining producing wells was $1,792,527.00. There-
fore, the matter was of some concern to Humble.
18. 239 So.2d 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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The error in question resulted from the compounding of
an erroneous entry on Humble's lease records of a symbol nor-
mally indicating expiration of a lease in its entirety. It was con-
tended by Humble that the release was ultimately executed by
the assistant supervisor of its lease records and rentals section
in error and that the error was sufficient to rescind the release,
Defendant-lessor argued that the instrument was executed
through negligence, warranting application of cases holding
that a party cannot rescind an instrument which he has negli-
gently executed. The court, citing article 1797 of the Civil Code
postulating consent as a requisite of a valid contract and articles
1819, 1820, 1823, and 1825 concerning error as vitiating consent,
together with supporting jurisprudence, held that the release had
been executed in error as contemplated by law. Judge Frug6
dissented. The application for rehearing was heard en banc with
Judges Frug6 and Miller voting for the grant of a rehearing.
The holding of the court in this case is a reasonable recog-
nition of the immensity of the task of oil companies, particularly
major companies, in maintaining records and evolving efficient
clerical systems which will protect vast investments. In this
case, it seems completely reasonable to protect an operator
against the kind of error involved and the kind of loss which
might have resulted. There is, perhaps, some merit to de-
fendant's position that there was actually no error, as con-
templated by the Civil Code as vitiating consent, but mere
negligence. However, considering the personality of the indi-
vidual clerk in this case as compared with the corporate person-
ality which actually performed the juridical act, there can be
little doubt that in terms of Humble's corporate personality,
there was error as to a principal cause for execution of the
release and that, acting as a corporate entity, the release would
not have been given but for this error. Regardless of the tech-
nical arguments and analysis involved, the decision accom-
plishes equity. It was admitted by defendant that request for
the release was a request for a release only of the unit acreage
which had ceased production. To have given the lessor the
benefit of such a windfall clearly would not have comported
with ordinary concepts of fairness.
Implied Obligations
The decision in Baker v. Chevron Oil Co.,19 discussed above
19. 245 So.2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
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insofar as it involved the question of prescription of the mineral
servitude, also had a sidelight bearing on the matter of implied
obligations. As set forth above, plaintiffs were complaining
because the prescriptive date of their mineral servitude had
passed while Chevron was in the process of unitizing the servi-
tude tract with a gas well completed by it on neighboring lands.
The court had no trouble in holding that, as the unitization was
not completed until after the prescriptive date, the servitude had
expired. Plaintiffs claimed in the alternative that Chevron
should be responsible in damages for failure to complete the
unitization prior to the prescriptive date. When it became obvi-
ous that the unitization would not be completed by the prescrip-
tive date, Chevron had obtained a top lease from the landowner
and was thus protected in the matter. The court denied the plain-
tiffs' claim for damages, finding that Chevron had exercised dili-
gence in processing the unitization and that the servitude expired
without negligence of any kind on Chevron's part.
This alternative argument gives a new dimension to the
recently evolved idea that the lessee may be under a duty to
the lessor to unitize.2 0 There is room in the decision of this case
for an inference that had the expiration of the plaintiff's servitude
resulted from lack of due diligence on the part of Chevron, the
claim for damages might have been sustained. To this writer,
the inference is appropriate. It is hornbook law that the lessee is
under a duty to administer the lease for the mutual benefit of
lessor and lessee.2 1 Article 2710 of the Code requires that a lessee
use the thing leased as a "good administrator." For a lessee to
use less than all due diligence to secure unitization when the
very existence of the thing subject to the lease is threatened is
clearly not the conduct of a "good administrator." As a practical
matter, recognition of the duty to exercise due diligence in cir-
cumstances of this kind would inhibit collusive conduct between
the lessee and a landowner, a proper goal. In the instant case,
it seems rather clear that Chevron did process the unitization
continuously and diligently and that it only sought a lease from
the landowner when it became clear that the unitization could
not be accomplished prior to the prescriptive date of the servi-
20. Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 290 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. La. 1968),
aff'd, 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
21. E.g., Brewster v. Lanyon Zino Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905), which
is quoted with favor in the Louisiana jurisprudence. See, e.g., Caddo Oil &
Mining Co. v. Producers Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1914).
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tude involved. Under these circumstances, Chevron cannot be
faulted for acting in its own, legitimate self-interest. However,
had there been evidence of lack of diligence, an award of dam-
ages would have been proper.
Working Interest Transactions
Overriding Royalties
The decision in the recent case titled Fontenot v. Sun Oil
Co.22 is an outgrowth of earlier litigation resulting in the par-
tial cancellation of a lease for nonpayment of production royal-
ties.23 In the earlier litigation, the district court had ordered can-
cellation of the lease in its entirety. Among the defendants were
three overriding royalty owners who did not appeal from the
judgment of the lower court. The court of appeal modified the
judgment of the district court by decreeing partial cancellation
of the lease and denying plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees,
which had been sustained in the lower court.
Subsequently, the parties fell into dispute over the effect of
the failure of the defendant-owners of the overriding royalties in
question to appeal from the judgment of the district court. It
was contended by plaintiff-lessor that, as defendants had not
appealed, the judgment was binding and the amount attributable
to the overriding royalties should inure to plaintiff's benefit. On
the other hand, it was contended by the defendants that under
the circumstances an appeal by the mineral lessee, the holder of
the principal or underlying right, preserved the accessory rights
of the overriding royalty owners. Plaintiff contended that under
articles 641 and 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure the defendant-
overriding royalty owners were indispensable parties and that,
therefore, the judgment of the district court was res judicata as
to them. Defendant relied upon two cases as presenting an
exception to this normal rule.24 One of these, Jackson v. Gulf
Refining Co., 25 was considered by the court to be "on all fours
in principle" with the case at bar. In that case the judgment of
the lower court recognized the claims of plaintiffs as landowners.
Among the defendants, in addition to an adverse claimant of the
22. 257 La. 642, 243 So. 2d 783 (1971).
23. Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967).
24. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Gary, 227 La. 524, 79 So.2d 869 (1955);
Jackson v. Gulf Ref. Co., 201 La. 721, 10 So.2d 593 (1942).
25. 201 La. 721, 10 So.2d 593 (1942).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
land itself, were two mineral owners claiming under that adverse
claimant. The two mineral owners failed to appeal the judg-
ment of the lower court, which was reversed, recognizing the
claim of defendant to the land. Plaintiffs subsequently sought by
separate suit to have the judgment of the lower court in the first
action as to the mineral owners recognized and enforced. The
court refused to sustain the position of plaintiffs.
It is noteworthy that Justice Summers and Barham dissented
in the Fontenot case, with Justice Tate being recused because of
participation in the decision by the court of appeal in the same
case. Despite the dissents, however, the decision in this instance
seems correct. If the claim of the holder of the principal, under-
lying right is sustained in whole or in part, those with rights
derivative from him should benefit by that judgment. Even if
the defendant-overriding royalty owners had been regarded as
bound by the judgment of the district court, the fact that the
position of the lessee was upheld in whole or in part on appeal
could be interpreted as meaning that to whatever extent the les-
see still owns the working interest, this carries with it the en-
tirety of the working interest, including the share of production
attributable to the overrides. Therefore, even if the overriding
royalty interests were viewed as being affected by the lower
court judgment, the result would be that the economic benefit
represented by those interests is restored to the working interest
and not to the lessor's royalty interest. Thus, if the lessee is will-
ing to allow the overriding royalties to remain in effect, it is not
a matter in which the lessor has any interest.
It should be noted, however, that this case apparently in-
volved what are known as "carved out" overriding royalty
interests and not a retained overriding royalty. The difference
would be critical under Louisiana law. In Louisiana, a mineral
lessee who conveys his working interest and retains an over-
riding royalty is viewed as having executed a sublease.26 In
such a situation, the prime lessor cannot sue the sublessee
directly. 27 Therefore, if a suit is properly brought against the
original lessee-sublessor who holds only an overriding royalty,
his failure to appeal the judgment cancelling the lease would
result in the extinction not only of his overriding royalty inter-
est, but those of all persons holding derivative interests in the
26. See, e.g., Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 165 La. 907, 116 So. 379 (1928).
27. Broussard v. Hassle Hunt Trust, 231 La. 474, 91 So.2d 762 (1956).
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way of carved out overriding royalties from him as well as
the interest of his sublessee and all of those holding interests
derivative from him.
Farm-out Agreements
Evangeline Drilling Co. v. Lawrence28 is another illustra-
tion of the perils of "not having it in writing" in Louisiana.
Evangeline Drilling Co. had obtained farm-out agreements from
defendant Lawrence, who in turn had obtained farm-outs from
others on the affected acreage. Under the agreement between
Evangeline and Lawrence, Evangeline was to receive a one-
half interest in the acreage in question in return for an obliga-
tion well. Evangeline had made contracts with two other com-
panies in which it agreed to give a portion of any interest earned
by Evangeline as consideration for equipment leases. The
answer of defendant Lawrence revealed that the agreement
between him and Evangeline was confected at the direction of
Thompson and Snodgrass who actually had been offered the
farm-outs and had accepted, agreeing to pay one-half of the
drilling costs. The contract, Lawrence maintained, was executed
with Evangeline at the direction of Thompson and Snodgrass,
Evangeline being their nominee.
Apparently Evangeline fell upon hard times economically.
Thompson and Snodgrass arranged a substantial bank loan
which they guaranteed in order to permit Evangeline to com-
plete drilling operations under the farm-out agreements. In
view of these financial difficulties and the favor of Thompson
and Snodgrass, Evangeline apparently agreed to surrender the
original farm-out agreements which it held from Lawrence. As
is often the case in transactions of this kind, the parties ap-
parently contemplated that Evangeline's interest would be
renegotiated, taking into account the fact that Thompson and
Snodgrass had succeeded in bailing Evangeline out of its eco-
nomic difficulties. Accordingly, Evangeline surrendered the
original agreements to Lawrence for destruction. Therein lay
its error. When the farm-out agreements were reissued by
Lawrence, they were made in favor of Thompson and Snod-
grass.
The litigation under discussion was a suit for specific per-
formance by Evangeline against Lawrence based on the original,
28. 243 So.2d 898 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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now destroyed, farm-out agreements. The court held that under
article 2199 of the Civil Code a tacit remission of debt had
occurred when the creditor, Evangeline, voluntarily surrendered
to its debtor, Lawrence, the original title under private signature
which established the obligation. The opinion does not reveal
whether Evangeline was ever successful in negotiating any
other interest in accordance with what apparently was the
informal agreement between it and Thompson and Snodgrass.
If no such negotiation occurred, the end result of the trans-
action was unfortunate indeed for Evangeline. It had drilled
two wells, leased some equipment, and signed a note for
$75,000.00. Under the law of Louisiana, as set forth by the court,
the original agreements between Lawrence and Evangeline could
not be enforced. Nor is it possible to enforce any informal,
unwritten agreement between Evangeline on one hand and
Thompson and Snodgrass on the other by which Evangeline can
obtain an interest in the properties in question. The only
possible remedy left would be on some quasi-contractual basis
for the value of the services rendered in drilling the wells. This
is small shrift indeed when the parties began by looking toward
an interest for Evangeline in potential producing properties. The
moral is clear, at least for Louisianians dealing in the oil and
gas world. That is, a handshake and a smile are no substitute
for a written, signed agreement.
Conservation
There is another noteworthy aspect to Breaux v. Apache Oil
Corp.29 As discussed above, a portion of the lease premises there
involved was included in a unit. The order was amended, alter-
ing the drill site, and operations for the drilling of the well were
commenced shortly before the rental date of the lease there in
dispute. In addition to urging that the lease had expired for
failure to commence operations prior to the rental date, the
lessor urged that the amendment of the order without notice
and hearing was improper. In line with prior jurisprudence, 80
the court held that this was an attempt to make a collateral
attack on the order of the commissioner. Orders of the com-
missioner can only be attacked under R.S. 30:12 by direct suit
in the district court for East Baton Rouge Parish. This is unques-
tionably a correct interpretation.
29. 240 So.2d 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
30. E.g., Vincent v. Hunt, 221 So.2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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